Title: Research on revenue-sharing contract of supply chain with a waste-averse supplier
Abstract: Revenue-sharing(RS) contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain(SC).In this paper,considering that the supplier and the retailer have waste-averse decision bias respectively,we propose a model of an SC contract aiming at coordinating a two-level SC,which is based on revenue sharing mechanism and stochastic customer demand.Then by analyzing the model,the paper explains that how the waste-averse decision bias of the supplier and the retailer influences the optimal order quantity,the quota of revenue sharing,and the coordination of SC.The result shows: when the retailer has waste-averse decision bias,the wholesale price that supplier offers and the quota that the retailer gives his revenue to the supplier will decrease as the retailer’s waste-averse decision bias increases;when the supplier has waste-averse decision bias,the wholesale price that he offers the retailer and the quota that the retailer gives his revenue to him will increase as his waste-averse decision bias decreases.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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