Title: Study on a Revenue Sharing Contract with Risk-Averse Agent
Abstract: Considering a supply chain with the risk-neutral supplier and the risk-averse retailer, the revenue sharing contract is studied. Firstly, the risk-averse behavioral preference of the retailer over random profit is represented in a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) framework. Then we obtain the supply chain's optimal solution and study the property of contract parameter. It is analyzed that the degree of risk aversion is influential to the contract parameter. Finally, an illustrative example is given to demonstrate that the revenue sharing contract may not coordinate the operation of the supply chain when the retailer is risk averse.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-05
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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