Title: Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods
Abstract: What is the norm governing our credibility assessments of others? According to Miranda Fricker, the answer is "obvious": we should match the level of credibility attributed to others to the evidence that they are offering the truth. In this paper, I will show that this evidentialist norm of credibility assessments is seriously wanting. In particular, I will identify and develop two kinds of testimonial injustice, which I call distributive and normative, and argue that this norm is fundamentally incapable of ruling them out. Finally, I will develop and defend an alternative norm—what I call the Wide Norm of Credibility—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the evidentialist version, but also makes vivid both the relational and normative dimensions of our credibility assessments.
Publication Year: 2018
Publication Date: 2018-01-01
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 38
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