Abstract: Abstract This chapter has two aims. First, Davis distinguishes between two forms of testimonial injustice: identity-based testimonial injustice and content-based testimonial injustice. Second, Davis utilizes this distinction to develop a partial explanation for the persistent lack of diverse practitioners in academic philosophy. Specifically, Davis argues that both identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice are prevalent in philosophical discourse and that this prevalence introduces barriers to participation for those targeted. As Davis shows, the dual and compounding effects of identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice in philosophy plausibly contribute to a lack of diversity in the social identities of practitioners and the discourses in which practitioners are engaged.
Publication Year: 2021
Publication Date: 2021-05-06
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 7
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