Abstract: As is well known, Kant has often been described as defending problematic, if not implausible, views on the relationship between freedom and natural determinism.1 He has even been portrayed as claiming that our free actions somehow occur outside of time, in an intelligible world, whilst their effects, in the empirical world, are completely determined by natural laws. More recently, Kant's account of freedom has been challenged by a further problem, namely its relationship with his work on anthropology.2 For instance, Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain write that 'Kant made his intentions quite clear: he proposed a pragmatic empirical anthropology. The problem is, as commentators have noted, that it is not at all clear how these declared intentions fit with some central claims of his critical philosophy.'3 Allen Wood acknowledges the unexpected nature of Kant's anthropological endeavours: The pragmatic approach to anthropology serves to indicate the great distance separating Kantian anthropology from […] what Kant's metaphysical theory of freedom and nature might lead us to expect.'4 Robert Louden actually holds that 'Kant did not satisfactorily address these issues.'5 The aim of this chapter is to address these issues in order to support the claim that Kant's Anthropology is compatible with his account of freedom. To do so, I begin by examining the kind of freedom that is at stake in the human sciences and the reasons why it seems particularly problematic.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-01
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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