Title: The Problem of Determinism and Free Will Is Not the Problem of Determinism and Free Will
Abstract: Abstract How the problem of determinism and free will is conceived needs to be rethought. This is the basic lesson to be drawn from a recent set of objections to some central arguments for incompatibilism. The problem that determinism raises for free will is not generated by determinism on its own but by the conjunction of determinism with some contingent fact about humans. This chapter reviews different possibilities for what that contingent fact might be and argues that it has to do with causal limitations. It then draws some implications for different aspects of the free will debate: the role of causation in formulating the problem of determinism and free will, the distinction between leeway and source incompatibilism, and the fate of incompatibilist arguments that appeal to an ultimacy condition on freedom.
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-11-07
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 31
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