Title: Research on Incentive Mechanism of Public Transportation Subsidies Based on Multi-task Principal-agent
Abstract: Reasonable government subsidy is the key to solve the problem of public transportation losses.Principal-agent relationship exists between bus company and government,besides the public transport operation must take account of economic benefits and social welfare,so this paper,from the perspective of quantitative analysis,establishes the optimal contract model of government subsidies by theory knowledge of multi-task principle-agent,and solves it.Then it discusses the influence factors in the optimal contract as well as the influence which incentive subsidies make on the enterprise effort degree based on analysis of the solution.The research findings also show that government should not stimulate endeavors spent in increasing social welfare,when the level of effort can't be observed,while decrease the incentives given to the effort increasing economic efficiency.The results provide a reference for the government makes a reasonable incentive allowance.
Publication Year: 2012
Publication Date: 2012-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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