Title: Production decision based on retailer-driven revenue-sharing contracts under many-to-one supply chain structure
Abstract: Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power under the many-to-one supply chain structure,the Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers,is established.Then,proofs for the game between manufacturers' producing strategies where a unique optimal symmetric Nash equilibrium exists are provided.Parameter decisions on the retailer's contracts are analyzed.The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain under revenue-sharing contracts is discussed.The impacts of contract parameters and products' substitutability level on the supply chain performance are further analyzed and verified through a simulation experiment.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 2
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