Abstract: David Chalmers uses Bayesian theories of credence to argue against referentialism about belief. This paper argues that Chalmers's Bayesian objections to referentialism are similar to older, more familiar objections to referentialism. There are familiar responses to the old objections, and there is a predictable way to modify those old responses to meet Chalmers's Bayesian objections. The new responses to the new objections are no less plausible than the old responses to the old objections. Chalmers's positive theory of belief and credence is structurally similar to typical referential theories of those objects, but his theory is more speculative and dubious.
Publication Year: 2016
Publication Date: 2016-02-26
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 31
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