Abstract:I consider a model of arming in which states choose in successive periods whether to build weapons and whether to attack, and in which arms accumulate across periods. Surprisingly, despite a long hist...I consider a model of arming in which states choose in successive periods whether to build weapons and whether to attack, and in which arms accumulate across periods. Surprisingly, despite a long history of formal models of arms races, the models we have in the literature lack one or more these features ‐ no choices (Richardson models), no option to use the weapons (Prisoners’ Dilemma models), or no accumulation of arms over multiple periods (Powell 1993, Jackson and Morelli 2009). In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium with two symmetric states, the states either (a) build up to stability at the first arms level such that a one-period “break out” does not give enough advantage to make attack worthwhile; or (b) fight at the outset because they anticipate that building to stability would not be worth the cost. (a) is more likely when the military technology favors defense and when the states have less “expansionist” preferences, in terms of value for territory. When the states differ enough in some respect ‐ capacity to build, preferences for conquest, or size of economy, for example ‐ mixed strategies appear on the equilibrium path. War or peace may result from an arms race between asymmetric rivals, with perhaps some tendency for races to be more dangerous as they proceed.Read More
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 7
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