Abstract: Russia's 'Westernization' Stage Is Seen as Over ... LEONTYEV: PRO-WESTERN STAGE OF REFORM, ENDING IN EARLY 1992, BROUGHT DISAPPOINTMENT; IN NEW NATIONAL STAGE, RUSSIA WILL GET OUT OF CRISIS ON ITS OWN; HOMEGROWN LIBERALISM, FREE ECONOMY WILL DEVELOP WITHOUT NATIONAL-PATRIOTS OR NATIONAL-SOCIALISTS; A PARTNER'S ROLE FOR WEST ... AFTER THE FAILURE OF WESTERNIZATION. (By Mikhail Leontyev. Sevodnya, Nov. 24, p. 1. Condensed text:) The time has come to tally some results. One stage of the transformation of post-Communist Russia has ended, and a fundamentally new one is beginning. The first period was marked by a course aimed at rapid Westernization and entry into Europe and by a completely orientation in foreign and domestic policy, with enormous hopes for decisive economic assistance and solidarity with a country that had thrown off communism; had set everyone free, heedless even of its own losses and interests; had voluntarily and happily capitulated in the cold war; and had voluntarily taken on the burden of reparations for that defeat. ... This period began under Gorbachev and peaked in the first quarter of 1992, when Yegor Gaidar said: have an opportunity to use for our reform resources that significantly exceed our domestic possibilities. These hopes on the part of political leaders did not just fall from the sky; they were grounded in a very optimistic public mood that was fully commensurate with them. This period ended in defeat and disappointment a defeat for the West, which for all practical purposes totally missed the opportunity to bring about Russia's soft integration into the Western world, leaving those political forces in Russia that had been counting on a future in the position of undoubted political outsiders. Now objectively thinking democrats who understand the hopelessness of political mimicry are very much aware of the modesty of their immediate prospects. They hope only for one thing: that they will not pass on the cause of post-Communist evolution, which they began, into the worst possible hands. Incidentally, this is what is giving impetus (at least some impetus) to the dreary idea that they themselves might personally nurture some sort of democratic future. . . . ... The stage of transformation that is beginning today is a national stage. We must get it into our heads that Russia is going to emerge from its very grave and very inevitable crisis on its own, with no support from outside. No one is going to help us, although some can hinder us a great deal. We need foreign investments, and we will get them if all goes well, but investments are not aid. We will get them on very tough market terms. ... In this situation, the range of possibilities is much broader than it is under the pro-Western vector, which posits a specific ideal model and has patented external inspectors to track and evaluate the parameters of movement toward this model. This new unpredictability gives rise to fear, perhaps fully justified fear, among democrats both our domestic Westerners and the actual foreign ones. National development with an inevitable measure of autarky, first of all a cultural/values autarky, is fraught with the danger of very exotic forms of originality that are not limited by civilization and common sense. At the same time, all national-patriotic constructs imply, in one way or another, the restoration of state management of the economy, something that is hardly possible to accomplish even at the cost of considerable bloodshed when the state itself is breaking up. One can console oneself with the thought that no national-socialist prospect for Russia exists, that it is simply a road to disaster, but this is consolation, especially for the Russian population. ... However, national development creates previously unknown prospects for Russian liberalism and for the building of a truly free economy and an organic societal structure grounded in natural traditions and possibilities and in national cultural values. In building state, public and economic institutions virtually from scratch and ridding itself of social constructivists who seek to impose on Russia their own models (from American to Chinese), Russia will be able to realize advantages that virtually no other country has at present. ... There is another undoubted plus in all this, especially as concerns the choice of political solutions: We will no longer have to keep looking slavishly over our shoulder at the West, fearing that we will get a grade of poor in democracy or in foreign-policy behavior. The period of training for life has ended, and everything that can be comprehended has been comprehended. We need partners, but we do not need mentors. In light of the discussions, which have been drawn out to indecent lengths, on admitting Russia even to the Council of Europe, for example, one can assume that when the West finally gets around to admitting us, there simply will be no one left in Russia with whom to discuss the matter.
Publication Year: 1994
Publication Date: 1994-12-21
Language: en
Type: article
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