Title: Burying the Right to Justice in Backyard Battlefields: Militarization in Mexico Conflicts with the American Convention on Human Rights
Abstract: I. INTRODUCTIONThe Mexican federal government relied on its military to instill public order in Mexico throughout the twentieth century.1 The armed forces increasingly supplanted police forces during the Mexican Dirty War in the 1970s to 1980s to suppress indigenous and peasant social movements, particularly in southern Mexico.2 In the 1990s, the military was used to quell the uprisings of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional) (EZLN) and the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Popular Revolucionario).3 In the decades since, Mexican presidents have relied on the military to fulfill traditional police roles, continue to suppress uprisings, combat the drug trade, and weaken organized crime.4 During President Felipe Calderon's administration, the government initiated the war on drugs,5 and increased its use of the armed forces to fulfill civilian police roles.6The increase in military presence in civilian law enforcement forces correlates to an increase in crimes committed by the military against civilians.7 The majority of these crimes have gone unpunished because crimes committed by the military against civilians are subject to military jurisdiction under the Military Justice Code, as opposed to the civilian law enforcement and judicial regime.8 The consequence is unbridled impunity for soldiers who commit crimes against civilians.9 Military adjudication of crimes against civilians creates institutional hesitancy of tribunal members to enforce the law.10Over the past decade, the Inter-American Human Rights system issued recommendations and decisions in several cases that involved military officers committing crimes against civilians.11 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) heard four cases since 2008 in which members of the Mexican military were held to have committed grave human rights violations.12 The IACtHR has consistently held that military investigation and adjudication of crimes committed by the military against civilians violates the right to judicial guarantees under the American Convention on Human Rights.13 Specifically, this type of adjudication and investigation violates Article 8, regarding judicial guarantees, and Article 25, regarding judicial protection.14 In July 2011, Mexico's Supreme Court issued a resolution (Radilla Resolution) recognizing that the Military Justice Code was incompatible with Mexico's Constitution and the American Convention.15 Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held that military tribunals should not decide cases in which the rights of civilians are at stake.16The Supreme Court also held that it had original jurisdiction to hear cases involving military jurisdiction.17 In May 2012, the court announced that it had received twenty-eight cases involving military jurisdiction from lower courts, and ordered all lower courts to postpone final rulings in pending cases involving the transfer of human rights violations from civilian to military jurisdiction until it had resolved the constitutional issue in the cases before it.18 Under Mexico's civil law system, the Radilla case does not itself set a precedent for the unconstitutionality of military jurisdiction over civilians, but it has opened the door to creating binding precedent by allowing the court to hear a series of cases on the same constitutional issue.19This Comment evaluates whether the Radilla Resolution complies with American Convention Articles 8 and 25 and investigates whether the militarization of law enforcement in Mexico is an obstacle to full compliance. Part II(A) introduces the concept of police militarization, a process that is increasingly occurring throughout Mexico.20 It describes the recent Radilla Resolution of the Mexican Supreme Court and the jurisprudence in the Inter-American system regarding the right to justice under Articles 1, 2, 8, and 25 of the American Convention.21The Radilla Resolution, although it is a vital step toward compliance with American Convention Articles 8 and 25, does not end military jurisdiction over investigation and adjudication of violations committed by military personnel because it is not binding, but it does create a window to do so. …
Publication Year: 2012
Publication Date: 2012-08-10
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 1
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