Abstract:We analyze a general framework for modeling agents whose utility is derived from both their actions and the perceptions of others about their type. We show that such perception games always have equil...We analyze a general framework for modeling agents whose utility is derived from both their actions and the perceptions of others about their type. We show that such perception games always have equilibria, and discuss two natural refinements. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework in a variety of contexts, with a particular emphasis on privacy-related issues. Gradwohl gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF award #1216006. Smorodinsky gratefully acknowledges the support of ISF grant 2016301, the joint Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab, Technion VPR grants and the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion. We also thank Jana Friedrichsen, Ehud Kalai, Gil Kalai, Eddie Dekel and Juuso Valimaki for insightful comments. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA. Email: [email protected]. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. Email: [email protected].Read More
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-09-05
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 7
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