Title: Substance, Essence and Attribute in Spinoza, Ethics I
Abstract:Both Descartes before Spinoza and Leibniz after him continued the medieval
Aristotelian tradition of 'supernaturalizing' Aristotle's conception of God as first
substance, and of treating God as the ...Both Descartes before Spinoza and Leibniz after him continued the medieval
Aristotelian tradition of 'supernaturalizing' Aristotle's conception of God as first
substance, and of treating God as the creator of natural substances. Because Spinoza
adopts the terminology of that tradition, while identifying Nature with God, he is
widely taken to supernaturalize Nature. This presupposes that he conceives his
metaphysical axioms as the medievals did theirs, as true of all logically possible
worlds, and per se nota to the human intellect. Unlike them, however, he holds that
the mechanical principles of nature, while per se nota, are true only of the actual
world. This suggests that his conception of what is per se no tum in metaphysics is
holistic, and presumes experience of the actual world. Assuming this, it is shown
that his theory of substance in Ethics I must be elucidated on naturalist lines. The
objection raised by de Vries to ElplOs, that really distinct attributes cannot, as
Spinoza maintains, constitute one and the same substance (or essence of a substance),
is shown to be valid on the 'supernaturalizing' interpretation of Spinoza's theory,
and Spinoza's replies to it in Ep9 and ElplOs are shown to be question-begging.
However, on the naturalist interpretation of it, Spinoza's doctrine in ElplOs is
shown to be defensible. Pollock's explanation of why his arguments in ElplOs and
Eplld are incompatible with the naturalist interpretation is adopted.Read More