Title: Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws
Abstract: Much public and private enforcement of the antitrust laws is based on a concern with exclusiou, or in antitrust jargon foreclosure, of competing firms from the market. Such seemingly disparate practices as tying arrangements, predatory pricing, vertical mergers, exclusive dealing, and group boycotts are all challenged as tending to exclude competitors on grounds unrelated to the superior efficiency of the firm or firms doing the excluding. The economists of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, Aaron Director and others,' have mounted a powerful attack on the implicit economic theory that underlies the current policy of the law towards the allegedly exclusionary practices. One purpose of this article is to restate these criticisms and in a few places extend them. The article will also indicate some respects in which I consider the criticisms overstated. Another purpose is to indicate the precise implications for antitrust policy of an appropriately qualified critique of the economic premises of current policy. These implications concern both the substantive content of the law and the allocation of responsibilities for law enforcement.