Title: IS “UNTRUSTWORTHY” THE NEW “THREATENING”? CHINA’S SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM THROUGH THE PRISM OF SECURITIZATION
Abstract: AbstractChina's Social Credit System (SCS) has been portrayed in much Western media coverage as an instrument for full-scale social control that collects and analyses behavioural data on an unprecedented scale. This perception has been countered by scholars who argue that the SCS should be seen more as a tool focused on strengthening law enforcement. This article argues that the development and operations of the SCS should be understood as a long-term process of "securitisation", intended to counter a crisis of trust in Chinese society. By introducing this "trust" discourse, the SCS creates an environment that justifies the need to employ extraordinary measures against breakers of social trust, measures that include reputational sanctions and joint punishments. Whether this securitisation process will succeed in efficiently curtailing untrustworthy behaviours in the social, political and economic spheres remains uncertain. It might be hampered by Chinese society's limited knowledge of the SCS, as well as by the limited impact of the SCS on people's lives. Alternatively, the introduction of measures that are too intrusive might trigger public disapproval. While ongoing local trials primarily involve schemes to reward "good" behaviour, since 2021 punitive measures targeted at trust-breakers have been standardised at the central government level. This article is based on an analysis of Chinese-language documents and its primary focus is on these centrally-designed SCS sanctions. It adds to the existing literature not only by proposing a new perspective through which the SCS may be perceived but also by discussing the measures targeted at individuals, the shape of which has been moulded by the recent standardisation activities. AcknowledgmentsI am deeply grateful to Marcin Kaczmarski and Elzbieta Pron for their insightful comments on the earlier drafts. I would also like to express my gratitude for the anonymous reviewers' and the Editor's suggestions on how to improve the paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See e.g., Steven W. Mosher, 'China's New "Social Credit System" is a Dystopian Nightmare'. New York Post, May 18, 2019, https://nypost.com/2019/05/18/chinas-new-social-credit-system-turns-orwells-1984-into-reality/.2 See e.g., Xin Dai, 'Enforcing Law and Norms for Good Citizens: One View of China's Social Credit System Project'. Development Vol. 63 (2020): 38–43.3 Niva Yau, 'Chinese Governance Export in Central Asia'. Security and Human Rights Vol. 32 (2022): 28–40.4 The SCS website: https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/?navPage=2.5 See e.g., Xu xu, Genia Kostka and Xun Cao, 'Information Control and Public Support for Social Credit Systems in China'. The Journal of Politics Vol. 84. Issue 4: 2234; Xin Dai, 'Toward A Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China'. SSRN Electronic Journal (2018): 19–20.6 The subjects are not limited to individuals. They also include, among others, business entities and social organizations.7 Note: "trust-breaking" and "untrustworthy" are used interchangeably here.8 For an overview of different systems see e.g., Chuncheng Liu, 'Multiple social credit systems in China'. Economic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter Vol. 21. Issue 1 (2019).9 For the distinction between the two see e.g., Mo Chen and Jens Grossklags, 'An Analysis of the Current State of the Consumer Credit Reporting System in China'. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Vol. 4 (2020): 91.10 For an important document see: State Council (SC), 'Zhengxin ye guanli tiaoli' (Regulations on the management of credit reporting industry), 2012.11 For a history of the development of SCS see e.g., Xin Dai, 'Toward A Reputation State', op. cit., pp. 8–12.12 See: SC, 'Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao (2014–2020 nian)' (Planning outline for the construction of the Social Credit System [years 2014–2020]), 2014. This is a major document that basically conceptualized the SCS as a complex project extended to different areas of governance.13 Haili Li and Genia Kostka, 'Accepting but Not Engaging with It: Digital Participation in Local Government-Run Social Credit Systems in China'. Policy & Internet Vol. 14. Issue 4 (2022): 845–874.14 There is no central list of rewards, and out of 51 joint rewards or punishments mechanisms, solely five are devoted to rewards and other three include them partially, whereas the rest involve exclusively punishments (as of August 2019). See: National Public Credit Information Center (NPCIC), '2019 nian 8 yue xinzeng shixin lianhe chengjie duixiang gongshi ji shuoming' (Newly added subjects to joint punishments for trust breaking in August 2019 – disclosure and explanation), 5 September, 2019, www.gov.cn/fuwu/2019-09/05/content_5427393.htm.15 Fan Liang, Vishnupriya Das, Nadiya Kostyuk and Muzammil M. Hussain, 'Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China's SCS as a State Surveillance Infrastructure'. Policy and Internet Vol. 10. Issue 4 (2018): 426.16 Samantha Hoffman, 'Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP's Plan for China'. China Brief Vol. 17. Issue 11 (2017).17 Liav Orgad and Wessel Reijers (Eds.), 'A Dystopian Future? The Rise of Social Credit Systems'. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2019/94 (2019).18 Jinghan Zeng, 'China's Date with Big Data: Will it Strengthen or Threaten Authoritarian Rule?'. International Affairs Vol. 92. Issue 6 (2016): 1457.19 Marianne von Blomberg and Haixu Yu, 'Shaming the Untrustworthy and Paths to Relief in China's Social Credit System'. Modern China, 17 February, 2023.20 Alexander Trauth-Goik, 'Civilized Cities or Social Credit? Overlap and Tension between Emergent Governance Infrastructures in China'. Global Media and China, 10 March, 2023.21 Fan Liang and Yuchen Chen, 'The Making of "Good" Citizens: China's Social Credit Systems and Infrastructures of Social Quantification'. Policy & Internet Vol. 14. Issue 1 (2022): 114–135.22 Genia Kostka, 'China's Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval'. New Media & Society Vol. 21. Issue 7 (2019): 1565–1593.23 For a discussion on the Law, see: Adam Knight, 'Basket Case: Reform and China's Social Credit Law'. China Law and Society Review Vol. 6. Issue 2 (2023): 181–210.24 See Wen-Hsuan Tsai, Hsin-Hsien Wang and Ruihua Lin, 'Hobbling Big Brother: Top-Level Design and Local Discretion in China's Social Credit System'. The China Journal Vol. 86 (2021).25 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23.26 Ibid., p. 24.27 Ibid., p. 30.28 For an overview of critical approaches to security and for literature, see: C.A.S.E. Collective, 'Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto'. Security Dialogue Vol. 37. Issue 4 (2006): 443–487.29 See e.g., Aglaya Snetkov, 'Theories, Methods and Practices – a Longitudinal Spatial Analysis of the (De)securitization of the Insurgency Threat in Russia'. Security Dialogue Vol. 48. Issue 3 (2017): 259–275.30 Matt McDonald, 'Securitization and the Construction of Security'. European Journal of International Relations Vol. 14. Issue 4 (2008): 564.31 Ibid., p. 570.32 Didier Bigo, 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease'. Alternatives Vol. 27 (2002): 65.33 Mark B. Salter (Ed.), 'Horizon Scan: Critical Security Studies for the Next 50 Years'. Security Dialogue Vol. 50. Issue 4S (2019): 22.34 Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, op. cit., p. 23.35 Michael C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics'. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 17 (2003): 511–531.36 Juha A. Vuori, 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders'. European Journal of International Relations Vol. 14. Issue 1 (2008): 69.37 Ibid., p. 69.38 Ibid., p. 69.39 SC, 'Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe', op. cit.40 McDonald, op. cit., p. 576.41 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 'Gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao' (Implementation Guideline for the Construction of Civic Morality), 2001. Note: In 2019, a similar document (Xinshidai gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao) was published jointly by the CCP CC and the State Council as an update. The update devotes an entire section to the issue of integrity (诚信).42 Wei Xin and Bo Yang, Chengxin weiji: Toushi Zhongguo yige yanzhong de shehui wenti (The Crisis of Integrity: A Glimpse into a Serious Social Problem in China). China Social Sciences Press, 2003.43 Li Cheng, 'Chengxin – daode jianshe de genben' (Integrity – the root of moral construction). Jingshen wenming daogan (Spiritual Civilization), issue 8 (2006), https://wenku.baidu.com/view/34d3c330915f804d2b16c12f.html?_wkts_=1694519495969. Note: on 3rd December 2001, People's Daily published an article of the same title (see Rogier Creemers, 'China's Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control'. SSRN Electronic Journal (2018): 7), yet it is no longer available at the People's Daily website.44 'Jiang Zemin zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiliu ci quanguo daibiao dahuai shang de baogao' (Jiang Zemin's report at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China), https://www.gov.cn/test/2008-08/01/content_1061490_5.htm.45 The primary connotation of integrity to market economy was a result of the economic reform triggered in the Deng Era and related problems that emerged. For a discussion on the topic of the SCS economic origin see e.g. Creemers, op, cit., pp. 8–12.46 These and other important excerpts from Xi's CSV-related speeches can be found here: https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-12/08/c_129395314.htm.47 SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiaqiang geren chengxin tixi jianshe de zhidao yijian' (Guiding opinion of the SC GO on strengthening the construction of personal trustworthiness system), 2016.48 SC, 'Guowuyuan guanyu jianli wanshan shouxin lianhe jili he shixin lianhe chengjie zhidu jiakuai tuijin shehui chengxin jianshe de zhidao yijian' (Guiding opinion of the SC on the establishment and improvement of the system of joint incentives for keeping trust and joint punishments for breaking trust and accelerating the construction of social trustworthiness), 2016.49 Knight, op. cit.50 Per the definition in this document: NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo gonggong xinyong xinxi jichu mulu (2021 nianban)' (National basic catalog of Public Credit Information [2021 edition], 2021a.51 For definition see e.g., National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) General Office (GO), 'Gonggong xinyong xinxi baogao biaozhun (2021 nianban)' (Standards for Public Credit Information Reports [2021 edition]), 2021a.52 See e.g., NDRC and People's Bank of China (PBoC), 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei renmin yinhang guanyu jiaqiang he guifan shouxin lianhe jili he shixin lianhe chengjie duixiang mingdan guanli gongzuo de zhidao yijian' (Guiding opinion of the NDRC and PBOC on strengthening and standardising the management of the lists of trustworthy and untrustworthy subjects of joint punishments and rewards), 2017.53 See Vincent Brussee, Social Credit: The Warring States of China's Emerging Data Empire. Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 54–56.54 NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting guanyu kaizhan shixin yueshu cuoshi qingli guifan gongzuo de tongzhi' (Notice of the NDRC GO on carrying out the work of sorting out and standardising restrictive measures for breaking trust), 2021b. The requirements are set out in the following document: SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu wanshan shixin yueshu zhidu goujian chengxin jianshe changxiao jizhi de zhidao yijian' (Guiding opinion of the SC GO on further improvement restrictive measures for breaking trust and on the establishment of a long-term mechanism for trustworthiness construction), 2020.55 NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo gonggong xinyong', op. cit. Note: localities are allowed to propose local variations to the catalogue.56 Ibid. See the full list of information types in the document.57 For details see: Ibid.58 Data disclosure itself is not novel or unique to the SCS. For instance, the principle of sharing administrative punishments with the public is stipulated in the People's Republic of China (PRC) Administrative Penalties Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng chufa fa, art. 48).59 For details on levels of the seriousness of untrustworthy behavior see e.g., NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting guanyu jinyibu wanshan "xinyong zhongguo" wangzhan ji defang xinyong menhu wangzhan xingzheng chufa xinxi xinyong xiufu jizhi de tongzhi' (Notice of the NDRC GO on further improving the credit repair mechanism for administrative punishment information on the "Credit China" website and local credit websites), 2019. For the types of data that are assigned a "trust" label see e.g., NDRC and PBoC, 'Guanyu dui shixin zhuti jiaqiang xinyong jianguan de tongzhi' (Notice on strengthening credit supervision of trust-breaking subjects), 2018 (note – this was a trial document which expired on 31.12.2020).60 For the analysis of the disclosed content see: Severin Engelmann, Mo Chen, Lorenz Dang and Jens Grossklags, 'Clear Sanctions, Vague Rewards: How China's Social Credit System Currently Defines "Good" and "Bad" Behavior'. FAT* '19: Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 2019.61 SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu', op. cit.62 SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiaqiang', op. cit.63 Alexander Trauth-Goik and Chuncheng Liu, 'Black or Fifty Shades of Grey? The Power and Limits of the Social Credit Blacklist System in China'. Journal of Contemporary China, September 30, 2022.64 SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiaqiang', op. cit.65 See von Blomberg and Yu, op. cit.66 SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiaqiang', op. cit.67 NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo gonggong xinyong', op. cit.68 See e.g., NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting', op. cit.69 See e.g., SC GO, 'Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu', op. cit.70 For a description of types and categories of punishments and the list punitive measures see: NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo shixin chengjie cuoshi jichu qingdan (2021 nianban)' (National basic list of punitive measures for breaking trust [2021 edition]), 2021b.71 SC, 'Jiaoshi zige tiaoli' (Regulations on teacher qualifications), 1995, art. 19.72 SC, 'Yule changsuo guanli tiaoli' (Regulations on entertainment venues management], 2006 (last revision: 2020), art. 5.73 See e.g., National People's Congress (NPC), 'Zhonghuarenmingongheguo dianying chanye cujin fa' (Film industry promotion law of the PRC), 2016: art. 16, 53; SC, 'Yinxiang zhipin guanli tiaoli' (Regulations on audio-visual products management), 2001 (last revision: 2016), art. 3, 46.74 See e.g., NPC, 'Zhonghuarenmingongheguo chujing rujing guanli fa' (Exit and entry management law of the PRC), 2012, art. 12, 28.75 NPC, 'Zhonghuarenmingongheguo bingyi fa' (Military service law of the PRC), 1984 (last revision: 2021), art. 57, 58.76 Some lately amended documents do mention SCS-related words, yet this trend is especially visible in the research sector. See e.g., NPC, 'Zhonghuarenmingongheguo kexue jishu jinbu fa' (Scientific and technological progress law of the PRC), 1993 (last revision: 2021).77 Note: The CPL can be supplemented locally, so can the PCI Catalog. NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo shixin chengjie cuoshi', op. cit.78 The important question of why the standardised SCS sanctions, as well as other SCS mechanisms implemented at different levels of administration, obtained their current shape deserves a detailed discussion separate paper.79 For a history of blacklists in China see Trauth-Goik and Liu, op. cit, pp. 5–6.80 Which raises the question of why blacklists were listed among other punitive measures that directly punish the trust-breakers. One of the reasons for it may be the fact that despite being a vehicle for the introduction of further punishments, their direct consequence is the reputational sanction which comes with the disclosure of the blacklists.81 NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting', op. cit. For discussions on the issue of insufficient legal basis of the SCS see e.g. Knight, op.cit.; Kun Shen, 'Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe de fazhi zhidao' (The Road to the Rule of Law in the Construction of the Social Credit System). Zhongguo Faxue (China Legal Science), issue 5 (2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20220910115025/http://fzzfyjy.cupl.edu.cn/info/1035/11343.htm.82 For the 2022 edition see: NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo shixin chengjie cuoshi jichu qingdan (2022 nianban)' (National basic list of punitive measures for breaking trust [2022 edition]), 2022.83 NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo shixin chengjie cuoshi', op. cit.84 SC, 'Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe', op. cit.85 NDRC and PBoC, 'Quanguo shixin chengjie cuoshi', op. cit.86 SC, 'Guowuyuan guanyu jianli wanshan', op. cit.87 See e.g., NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting guanyu zuohao lianhe chengjie anli guiji he xinxi gongxiang gongzuo de tongzhi' (Notice of the NDRC GO on doing a good job in collection and information sharing of joint punishment cases), 2018.88 See e.g., NDRC and PBoC, 'Guanyu dui shixin zhuti', op. cit.89 SC, 'Guowuyuan guanyu jianli wanshan', op. cit.90 Supreme People's Court (SPC), 'Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu xianzhi beizhixingren gaoxiaofei de ruogan guiding' (Several provisions of the SPC on limiting high consumption and relevant consumption of persons subject to enforcement), 2015, art. 3.91 NDRC, SPC, PBoC and 41 organs, 'Guanyu dui shixin bezhixingren shishi lianhe chengjie de hezuo beiwanglu' (Memorandum of understanding on joint punishments against untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement), 2016. For a full list of restrictions see the document.92 For a breakdown of MoUs see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/social-credit-mou-breakdown-beta/93 SC, 'Guowuyuan guanyu jianli wanshan', op. cit.94 NPCIC, op. cit.95 Ibid.96 See Bigo, op. cit., p. 65.97 Creemers, op. cit., p. 10.98 Other, e.g., bureaucratic interests might have influenced the withdrawal decisions as well, as discussed in the last paragraph of the article.99 Note: The central authorities themselves did not know exactly what shape the SCS was to take (Brussee, op. cit.).100 NDRC GO, 'Guojia fazhan gaigewei bangongting', op. cit.101 Trauth-Goik and Liu, op. cit., p. 15.102 Li and Kostka, op. cit., p. 7.103 Ibid., pp. 7–8.104 One study has already revealed how once informed about the repressive potential of the SCS, the Chinese show less support towards it: Xu et al., op. cit.105 See e.g., Holger Stritzel, 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond'. European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13. Issue 3 (2007).106 Note: While such a study would add yet another perspective to trust- and SCS-related research, scholars reveal that not solely the state may use the trust narrative in China. In implementing its credit schemes and initiatives, the private sector also does it and "cultivates justice without law enforcement or formal legal intervention when social trust is eroded." (Gladys Pak Lei Chong, 'Cashless China: Securitization of Everyday Life Through Alipay's Social Credit System – Sesame Credit'. Chinese Journal of Communication Vol. 12. Issue 3 (2019): 296.)Additional informationFundingThis research was funded by a research grant number 2020/37/N/HS5/02910 from the National Science Centre, Poland (Narodowe Centrum Nauki).Notes on contributorsEmilie SzwajnochEmilie Szwajnoch is a research assistant at the University of Silesia in Katowice. Her current research focuses primarily on the Social Credit System, China's domestic security policy and its 'export' potential. She is the Primary Investigator of a PRELUDIUM grant from the National Science Centre, Poland. Email: [email protected]
Publication Year: 2023
Publication Date: 2023-08-08
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 1
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot