Abstract: Chapter 31 Functionalism and Qualia Robert Van Gulick, Robert Van GulickSearch for more papers by this author Robert Van Gulick, Robert Van GulickSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Susan Schneider, Susan SchneiderSearch for more papers by this authorMax Velmans, Max VelmansSearch for more papers by this author First published: 17 March 2017 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119132363.ch31 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Summary Functionalism, in one form or another, is probably at present the most commonly held position concerning the nature of mental states among philosophers. Functionalists all accept the basic thesis that mental kinds are functional kinds, and that what makes a mental item an item of a given mental type is the functional role it plays within a relevantly organized system. This chapter considers arguments meant to show that various forms of functionalism are unable to accommodate or explain some of the real features of qualia, as well as functionalist replies to those arguments. The traditional idea of qualia is closely linked with the classic representational theory of perception. The most influential qualia-based anti-functionalist arguments rely on intuitions about certain imaginary cases or thought experiments, especially those involving so-called "inverted qualia" and "absent qualia". The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Second Edition RelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2017
Publication Date: 2017-03-17
Language: en
Type: other
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 2
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