Abstract: The concept of moral complicity in ethics captures the idea that one can do wrong by being associated, in some way, with the wrongdoing of other individuals or of a collective one is part of. However, such a broad understanding of complicity does not itself provide useful moral guidance. It is impossible to completely dissociate oneself from all wrongdoing by others. Moreover, certain kinds of association with wrongdoing appear not to involve complicity. The crucial question is how to draw a line between actions that are complicit and thereby wrong, actions that are complicit but nevertheless morally permissible or even obligatory, and actions that are associated with others’ wrongdoing but not in a way that involves complicity. The two main conceptions of complicity – the causal and noncausal conceptions – each provide a different answer. This essay introduces these two conceptions and surveys some of the most important challenges that each faces.
Publication Year: 2017
Publication Date: 2017-06-21
Language: en
Type: other
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 1
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