Title: THE 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES AND THE ASCENT OF THE HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST PARADIGM
Abstract: * Senior Economic Counsel, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice. Many individuals provided invaluable assistance in tracking down materials cited herein. 1 Although the term is more conventional in U.S. antitrust law, I have long preferred the term delineation because it better describes the linedrawing exercise involved and avoids confusion with the Guidelines' formal statement of the hypothetical monopolist in the form of a definition of a market. See infra notes 13, 18-19, and accompanying text. 2 See Donald I. Baker 8c William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 311, 322 (1983) (Guidelines' important contribution); Franklin M. Fisher, Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1987, at 23, 28 (major step in the direction of sanity); Lawrence A. Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 632, 638 (1983) (Guidelines' innovative aspect); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 535, 539 (1983) (noteworthy intellectual feat); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805, 1822, 1864 (1991) (bold and thoughtful and a formidable achievement). 3 Critics argued that the Guidelines articulate abstract theory with no practical application. Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Bounding Markets in Merger Cases: Identifying Relevant Competitors, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 733, 754 (1984) (impractical conceptual device); Robert G. Harris 8c Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 464, 481 (1983) (simply impracticable); Joe Sims & William Blumenthal, New Merger Guidelines Provide No Real Surprises, Legal Times, June 21, 1982, at 17, 17 (no useful practical test); George J. Stigler & Robert A. Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, 28 J.L. & Econ. 555, 582 (1985) (Guidelines' approach completely nonoperational because [n] o method of investigation of data is ... specified that will allow the market to be determined empirically). Critics also argued that the Guidelines' approach yields overly broad relevant markets. Harris & Jorde, supra, at 486 (At every one of the major steps and at most of the subsidiary ones, the Guidelines use procedures which have the effect of increasing the size of the market, and therefore of reducing the shares of the merging firms in the market.); Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1822-23 (the Guidelines opt for market definitions that are overinclusive, and therefore systematically create the appearance of diminished market power); National Association of Attorneys General,
Publication Year: 2016
Publication Date: 2016-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 48
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