Title: Procurement Auctions with Capacity Constrained Suppliers
Abstract: In this paper we study two reverse auction formats in a single period setting, the sealed pay-as-bid and the open format, when suppliers are capacity constrained. In the pay-as-bid format we characterize the asymmetric bidding equilibrium for the case of two suppliers with uniformly distributed cost. We find that the pay-as-bid auction allocates business inefficiently and that a supplier’s bid is nonincreasing in the opponent’s capacity and is typically decreasing in its own capacity. We then characterize a descending price-clock open auction implementation and find that it is optimal and that the buyer’s expected cost decreases as capacity is more evenly spread. Finally, we find that the pay-as-bid auction results in a higher expected cost to the buyer as compared to the open auction. Full paper available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039.
Publication Year: 2015
Publication Date: 2015-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot