Title: Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possession
Abstract: 1. Let me begin by reconstructing Fodor's argument, as I understand it. Premise P1 in the following argument is my reconstruction of Fodor's premise P. For me, the core argument is clearer if we dispense with talk of inheritance, and with talk of states, capacities, and dispositions as satisfiers for a concept. The core idea involved in Premise P seems to be this: In order for a person to satisfy the possession conditions for a complex concept C, it is necessary and sufficient that the person satisfy the possession conditions for C's constituent concepts and also satisfy the possession conditions for C's mode of composition. (The rationale for this is that otherwise, the usual account of productivity fails.) I find it clearer to reformulate the Premise P as an expression of this idea -and to reconstruct the overall argument accordingly. So here's my reconstruction:
Publication Year: 1998
Publication Date: 1998-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 14
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