Abstract: Philosophy of action deals with questions about the nature of action and action-related concepts such as intention, reasons, and motivation.With this special issue, we hope to contribute to the Journal of Chinese Philosophy's mission of bringing insights gleaned from Chinese philosophy to bear on important issues in contemporary philosophy.A number of articles in this volume challenge or otherwise complicate previous accounts of differences between Chinese and Western philosophical accounts of action.In his 2009 paper "Action and Agency in Chinese Thought," Chris Fraser argues that, in contrast to Western accounts that emphasize deliberation and rational decisionmaking, resulting in a belief-desire model of agency, pre-Qin conceptions of agency are "concerned primarily with abilities, habits, and the skill-like performance of familiar patterns of activity." 1 Erica Brindley's article in this collection, entitled "Authoring Non-Action in Early China," similarly notes that "a few early Chinese discourse on action outline normative agency precisely by negating and having an agent abandon his or her ostensible position as a rational agent."However, Brindley goes on to highlight important similarities between Chinese and Western accounts, arguing that both emphasize individual choice, purpose, and desire.John Ramsey, in his paper "Wisdom, Agency, and the Role of Reasons in Mengzi," also challenges the contrast between deliberation-based Western models of agency and Chinese performance-based ones, arguing that the Mengzi at least includes both models.Susan Blake argues further in her paper, "Agency, Non-Action, and Desire in the Laozi," that deliberation is a necessary feature of the Daoist sage.Another set of papers discusses the connection between knowledge and action in the Chinese philosophical tradition.