Title: Endogenous entry under Bertrand-Edgeworth and Cournot competition with capacity indivisibility
Abstract: Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacities and active firms compete in prices or quantities. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid. In either strategic setting, the equilibrium of the game depends on the size of total demand at a price equal to the minimum average cost. With a sufficiently large market, the long-run competitive price emerges at a subgame-perfect equilibrium of either game. Failing the large market condition, equilibrium outcomes are quite different in the two games (in contrast to Kreps and Scheinkman), and neither game reproduces the competitive equilibrium.
Publication Year: 2006
Publication Date: 2006-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 1
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