Title: Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version
Abstract: It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with CGV payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to CGV that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments
Publication Year: 2013
Publication Date: 2013-01-28
Language: en
Type: preprint
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