Abstract: This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some <italic>sui generis</italic> normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain <italic>hybrid</italic> normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain <italic>sui generis</italic> normative properties. This is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties.
Publication Year: 2017
Publication Date: 2017-07-20
Language: en
Type: book
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 85
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