Title: Does Contract Enforcement Limit the Distribution of Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study
Abstract:In more consolidated markets where asymmetric bargaining power leaves one party with small contract rents, policies that attempt to balance bargaining power may be implemented. The economic eects of s...In more consolidated markets where asymmetric bargaining power leaves one party with small contract rents, policies that attempt to balance bargaining power may be implemented. The economic eects of such policies depend on the degree of legal enforcement. This paper examines how redistributing bargaining power among sellers and buyers aects long-term relationships when third party enforcement is partially and fully absent. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers and the enforceability of the contract. I nd that bargainingRead More
Publication Year: 2012
Publication Date: 2012-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot