Title: WHY EMPLOYERS PREFER NOT TO BARGAIN OVER JOBS
Abstract:In general we expect efficient bargaining between a union and an employer to cover employment as well as wages. But employers may find that they win higher profits if they bargain over wages alone, si...In general we expect efficient bargaining between a union and an employer to cover employment as well as wages. But employers may find that they win higher profits if they bargain over wages alone, since the threat of job losses can inhibit workers from pressing wage demands. This is shown to be the case in typical models which use the general (asymmetric) co-operative Nash-bargaining solution. So it is argued that the inclusion of jobs in bargaining is not just a question of efficiency, but also a question of power.Read More
Publication Year: 1985
Publication Date: 1985-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 2
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