Title: Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA
Abstract: Review of International EconomicsVolume 13, Issue 3 p. 501-517 Rules of Origin in North–South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA José Anson, José Anson HEC, Université de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Tel: 41-21-6923475; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorOlivier Cadot, Olivier Cadot Tel: 41-21-6923463; Fax: 41-21-6923495; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorAntoni Estevadeordal, Antoni Estevadeordal Integration and Regional Programs Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20577, USA. Tel: 1-202-6232614; Fax: 1-202-6233030; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorJaime de Melo, Jaime de Melo Département d’Economie Politique, Université de Genève, 40 Bvd du Pont d’Arve, 1211 Genève 4, Switzerland. Tel: 41-22-7058257; Fax: 41-22-7058293; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorAkiko Suwa-Eisenmann, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Federation Paris-Jourdan, 48 Bvd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. Tel: 33-1-4313-6325; Fax: 33-1-4313-6362; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorBolormaa Tumurchudur, Bolormaa Tumurchudur HEC, Université de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Tel: 41-21-6923475; E-mail: [email protected]. Cadot, Suwa-Eisenmann, and de Melo are thankful for the partial financial support from the World Bank. We thank David Colin for assistance, Céline Carrère, Luis Serven, and participants at a workshop at the World Bank for comments on an earlier draft.Search for more papers by this author José Anson, José Anson HEC, Université de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Tel: 41-21-6923475; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorOlivier Cadot, Olivier Cadot Tel: 41-21-6923463; Fax: 41-21-6923495; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorAntoni Estevadeordal, Antoni Estevadeordal Integration and Regional Programs Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Ave., NW Washington, DC 20577, USA. Tel: 1-202-6232614; Fax: 1-202-6233030; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorJaime de Melo, Jaime de Melo Département d’Economie Politique, Université de Genève, 40 Bvd du Pont d’Arve, 1211 Genève 4, Switzerland. Tel: 41-22-7058257; Fax: 41-22-7058293; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorAkiko Suwa-Eisenmann, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Federation Paris-Jourdan, 48 Bvd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. Tel: 33-1-4313-6325; Fax: 33-1-4313-6362; E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorBolormaa Tumurchudur, Bolormaa Tumurchudur HEC, Université de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Tel: 41-21-6923475; E-mail: [email protected]. Cadot, Suwa-Eisenmann, and de Melo are thankful for the partial financial support from the World Bank. We thank David Colin for assistance, Céline Carrère, Luis Serven, and participants at a workshop at the World Bank for comments on an earlier draft.Search for more papers by this author First published: 06 July 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00520.xCitations: 51 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North–South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North–South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal–agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint. Citing Literature Volume13, Issue3August 2005Pages 501-517 RelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2005
Publication Date: 2005-08-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 167
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