Abstract: Contemporary Accounting ResearchVolume 25, Issue 1 p. 109-147 CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality* Jennifer Francis, Jennifer Francis Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAllen H. Huang, Allen H. Huang Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorShivaram Rajgopal, Shivaram Rajgopal University of WashingtonSearch for more papers by this authorAmy Y. Zang, Amy Y. Zang University of RochesterSearch for more papers by this author Jennifer Francis, Jennifer Francis Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAllen H. Huang, Allen H. Huang Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorShivaram Rajgopal, Shivaram Rajgopal University of WashingtonSearch for more papers by this authorAmy Y. Zang, Amy Y. Zang University of RochesterSearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 January 2010 https://doi.org/10.1506/car.25.1.4Citations: 299 * Accepted by Peter Easton. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) Conference, generously supported by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Certified General Accountants of Ontario, the Certified Management Accountants of Ontario, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario. This research was supported by the Global Capital Markets Center at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, the Accounting Development Fund at the University of Washington, and the Simon School of Business at the University of Rochester. We appreciate comments from Peter Easton, Ryan LaFond, Hemang Desai, and Terry Shevlin, participants at the 2006 CAR Conference, and workshop participants at Duke University and the University of Texas at Austin. 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Citing Literature Volume25, Issue1Spring 2008Pages 109-147 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2008
Publication Date: 2008-03-01
Language: en
Type: article
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