Title: Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition
Abstract: Chapter 1 Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition Stephen Stich, Stephen StichSearch for more papers by this authorKevin P. Tobia, Kevin P. TobiaSearch for more papers by this author Stephen Stich, Stephen StichSearch for more papers by this authorKevin P. Tobia, Kevin P. TobiaSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Justin Sytsma, Justin SytsmaSearch for more papers by this authorWesley Buckwalter, Wesley BuckwalterSearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 April 2016 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118661666.ch1Citations: 18 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Summary Many experimental philosophers are philosophers by training and professional affiliation, but some best work in experimental philosophy has been done by people who do not have advanced degrees in philosophy and do not teach in philosophy departments. This chapter explains that the experimental philosophy is the empirical investigation of philosophical intuitions, the factors that affect them, and the psychological and neurological mechanisms that underlie them. It explores what are philosophical intuitions, and why do experimental philosophers want to study them using the methods of empirical science. The positive program in experimental philosophy shares the goal of the substantial part of traditional philosophy that is concerned with the analysis of important philosophical concepts. The negative program has implications for philosophical projects whose goal is conceptual analysis. There have been a number of responses to the challenge posed by experimental philosophy's negative program. The chapter also focuses on the expertise defense. References Abarbanell, Linda, and Marc D. Hauser. 2010. Mayan Morality: An Exploration of Permissible Harms. Cognition 115: 207–224. 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