Title: The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation
Abstract: Why did limited government and 'constitutionalism' (the rule of law, constitutional rules, and political representation) evolve in some societies but not others? Guided by history, this paper examines why this evolution reflects dependence on administrators to implement policy choices including those affecting them. Limited government and constitutionalism are manifestations of equilibria in which the administrators have the power to influence choices. The thesis that constitutionalism reflects an equilibrium among the powerful differs from the prevailing one, which asserts that it reflects gains to the weak from constraining the powerful. Analyzing the determinants and implications of administrative power reveals its impact on trajectories of economic development. Distinct administrative-power equilibria have different impacts on the security of the non-elite’s property rights; intra-state and inter-state violence (e.g. civil wars and wars, respectively); policies; entry barriers to new technologies and economic sectors; the nature of political conflicts; and the means to resolve conflicts concerning political rights. JEL Codes: N00, N4, O00, P00, D70, K00. • This paper greatly benefitted from comments from and discussions with Ran Abramitzky, Adi Greif, and Margaret Levi. I am also grateful to Luz Marina Arias, Yadira Gonzalez de Lara, Avinash Dixit, Yaron Greif, Elhanan Helpman, Jim Fearon, Joel Mokyr, Ethan Segal, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper is forthcoming in Elhanan Helpman (ed.), Institutions and Growth. Harvard UP. E.g. Hardin 1989; North and Weingast 1989; and Myerson 2007. For recent analyses of political representation in this line of research, see Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Ticci and Vindigni 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Lezzeri and Persico 2004. See discussion in Barzel 2002. For social and cultural determinants of constitutionalism see, e.g. Greif 1998; Aston and Philpin 2002; Mokyr 2006. 1 This paper presents a conjecture regarding the origin of constitutionalism, why it was historically insufficient to protect property rights, and why it was nevertheless positively correlated with prosperity. Recent theories of constitutionalism have focused on constitutional rules viewing them as a coordination device that fosters the security of property rights. Motivated by the interests of protecting their wealth, property owners utilize constitutional rules to coordinate on an equilibrium in which powerful rulers and elite respect property rights. Constitutionalism is thus a means to constrain the powerful. However, history suggests that constitutionalism emerged to facilitate cooperation among the powerful. Constitutionalism was not a means to coordinate the weak on an equilibrium constraining the powerful but was an observable implication of particular equilibria among th powerful. Specifically, constitutionalism reflects equilibria in which those with the administrative capacity to implement or counteract policy choices had to take into account each other’s preferences when making choices. Roughly speaking, constitutionalism served as a means to facilitate cooperation and decision-making among the powerful while reducing costly, on-the-equilibrium-path conflicts among them. Administrative equilibria determined which, if any, the three main features of constitutionalism (i.e. constitutional rules, the rule of law and political representation) emerged and with respect to whom. The premise of the analysis is that policy choices are nothing but a wish without an administration to implement them. An administration is composed of individuals and organizations that are directly involved in the implementation of military, financial, legal or other policy choices (e.g. a professional or citizens’ army, militias, tax farmers, the IRS, feudal lords, self-governed provinces and cities, tribes, and lineages). An effective administration has the organizational capacity to execute policy choices by acting on the ruler’s behalf (e.g. assembling an army, advancing loans, collecting taxes, or dispensing justice), making policy choices publically known, monitoring behavior, and punishing deviators.
Publication Year: 2008
Publication Date: 2008-12-31
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 35
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