Title: Re-Examining Gasperini: Damages Assessments and Standards of Review
Abstract: In May, 2001, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.1 While the Court's decision in Cooper was undoubtedly correct insofar as its holding goes, the case created a collateral issue for federal courts sitting in diversity under both the Erie Doctrine,2 and under the Court's prior precedent as announced in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.3 In Cooper, the Court held that an appellate court reviewing a punitive damages award for Constitutional excessiveness should apply a de novo standard because a punitive damage award is not a finding of fact, and, therefore, reviewing the award de novo does not invade the province of the jury.4 Conversely, the Gasperini Court held that the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion.5 Admittedly, the award in Gasperini was compensatory, not punitive, and principled distinctions can be made between the two types of awards, particularly in light of the Cooper Court's rationale for application of the de novo standard, i.e., that a punitive damage award was not a fact.6 However, the case poses a problem that goes far beyond a court's having to apply two standards of review, and may rise to constitutional proportions.
Publication Year: 2006
Publication Date: 2006-08-29
Language: en
Type: article
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