Title: Rabbi Chaim David Halevi Responsa <i>Aseh lechah rav</i> III: 57: Incarceration in Jewish Law
Abstract: In Deuteronomy (6:18) it says: “Do what is right (yashar) and good in the sight of the Lord, that it may go well with you and that you may be able to possess the good land that the Lord your God promised on oath to your fathers.” According to the opinion of R. Elazar, “Mishneh Torah” is called “The Book of the Right,” about which is said (II Samuel 1:18), “He ordered the Judites to be taught [The Song of the] Bow. It is recorded in the Book of Right,” for it says in Deuteronomy: “Do what is right and good in the sight of the Lord” (Avodah Zarah 25a).The Maharsh”a (R. Samuel Eliezer Edels, Poland, 1555–1632) asks: “Just because the word ‘right’ is written in it, should the whole book be called ‘The Book of Right?’ Behold, in Exodus (15:26) it is written that ‘doing what is upright (yashar) in His sight’⁉” He answered, “Because they learned from this verse ‘beyond the letter of the law’ (lit. ‘within the line of the law’)/lifnim mi-shurat hadin.” … We will add our own opinion. However, first we ask another question: Behold, in that same verse the word “the good” (hatov) appears. Why should the book not be called “The Book of Good?” Furthermore, in Deuteronomy (18:26) another verse similar to this one is found, with a very substantial difference: “Be careful to heed all these commandments that I enjoin upon you … for you will be doing what is good and right in the sight of the Lord your God.”These two concepts, the good and the right, essentially contradict each other, and it would seem that each one has a unique substance. One who does the right, it is not necessary that their actions will be good; so too, one who does the good—that is not always the right, even if it is the desired action. A story that is told in the Talmud illuminates for us the quality of these two concepts“There were porters who broke a barrel of wine belonging to Rabbah bar bar Hana, [while in his service]. And he took their garments [for the damage caused]; and they came and complained before Rav. He said to [Rabbah bar bar Hana]: “Return their garments!” The latter questioned him: Is this the law? He answered: Yes, [as it is written]: “So follow the way of the good” (Prov. 2:20). (Rashi comments: lifnim mi-shurat ha-din) [Rabbah bar bar Hana] returned their garments. [The porters] said: “We are poor, we were working the whole day, we are hungry and have nothing [to eat].” [Rav] said to [Rabbah]: “Pay them their wages.” [Rabbah] asked [again]: “Is this the law?” He answered: “Yes; as it is written: ‘And keep to the paths of the just’” (Prov. 2:20).” (Baba Metzia 83a) Here we see clearly the great difference between the law (din), which is the right, and “the way of the good and paths of the just,” which is the good. The path on which Rabbah bar bar Hana was forced to walk was beyond the letter of the law. It turns out that these two concepts, “the good and the right,” seemingly cannot be upheld in one action, and it seems that the intent of the Torah is to different circumstances and concerns; in every circumstance a person is obligated to act according to the specific concern, sometimes in the path of the good, sometimes in the path of the right.In the Sifri (Re'eh 79) they read the above verse “for you will be doing what is good and right”—“The good in the eyes of Heaven, and the right in the eyes of people,” the words of R. Aqiva; R. Ishmael says: “The right in the eyes of Heaven and the good in the eyes of people.” From here [we learn] that both R. Aqiva and R. Ishmael derived both of the concepts above in the two types of commandments. R. Aqiva explained: in your relations with God, in the commandments between a person and God, act in the way of the good; and in your relations with other people, act in the way of the right. R. Ishmael interpreted it in the opposite way. Neither of them explained even with the slightest hint, why they each derived the meaning that they derived, and what is their method in interpreting this verse. However, in the case of R. Aqiva we can derive this from his general understanding of the relations between a person and their fellow.The definition of “the good” is not clear enough. At the time of an action a person is unable to weigh and discern what the way of the good is, that they must act according to it, especially if there is an opposition between the good and the right. One who wants to act according to the way of the good in an excessive manner is liable to fail and to endanger themselves by the goodness of their heart unlawfully, as we'll see further on, and possibly in opposition to the law and the right. Once matters come to this point—behold there is not good here.As we learned: “Two [people] who were walking along a [desolate] path and in one's hand was a jug of water. If both drank then both would die. If one drinks, that person would get to a settlement. Ben Petora derived [the following]: [Rather] both should drink and die, and not have one see the other's death. Until R. Aqiva came and taught: “Your brother shall live with you,” your life precedes your fellow's (Baba Metzia 62a). How could a person drink the jug of water, which does actually belong to them, and see their fellow die in front of their eyes? “It is better” that they both drink and both die. Ben Petora argues that it is better for a person to die together with their fellow, rather than cause their fellow's death in front of them as a result of egoism. It could be that this is “good,” but would a person think that this is “right?” Are they righteous in abandoning their own life in order to add an hour to their fellow's life and die together?Apparently this question bothered the denizens of the study hall greatly, and did not let their conscience rest “until” R. Aqiva came and “taught” (it is worthwhile to be accurate in reading the exchange. in regard to Ben Petora [the word used is] “derived”/darash; whereas in regards to R. Aqiva [the word used is] “taught”/limed), “Your brother shall live with you,” that is, your life has precedence. R. Aqiva did not debate Ben Petora: If it is true that “it is better that both drink and die”—perhaps it is good, but it is definitely not right. For it is the obligation of a person to make every effort to save a fellow life as long as they do not endanger their own life doing it, “your brother shall live with you,” and this is “the right.” This is the clear understanding of R. Aqiva: and you will do the right in the eyes of people. In this debate between R. Aqiva and R. Ishmael the concepts of the good and the right are completely separated.However, our rabbis' explication of the first verse: “Do what is right (yashar) and good in the sight of the Lord”—“The right and the good is compromise beyond the letter of the law” (Rashi), shows that they were coming to resolve this problem (how could a person fulfill the good and the right simultaneously) and therefore they explained: this is compromise beyond the letter of the law. So too in halakhah: “Assessed [goods which belong to a borrower and are seized by the lender in payment for a loan] can always return [to the lender if s/he pays back the loan], for it says: ‘Do what is right and good’” (Baba Metzia 35a). The force of law does not obligate returning the collateral that the court assessed for [and gave to] the lender. So too with the law one who owns property bordering another's property (bar-matzra): “we remove him [i.e., we disregard the privilege in acquisition that is implied by bordering a property] because it is said: ‘Do what is right and good’” (ibid., 108a). All these are a result of the principle of “beyond the letter of the law.” With this our Sages have taught us something great, that at a time that a person does not stand on their own rights but operates according to “beyond the letter of the law,” even though it seems as if they are passing up on the law and that which is right, and behold it is good—even so, in the eyes of God it is also that which is right, and the combination of these concepts is possible with one action in the aspect of: “the good and the right in God's eyes.”Just as these matters are in relation to the concepts themselves, so too is the matter in the essence of a person. We can say about a person at the time of doing a specific action that it is good or that it is right according to his actions at that time. However, we can never say about a person, as a result of one action in one breath that it is simultaneously “good and right.” This is not the case in relation to God. As King David expressed it in Psalms (25:8): “Good and right is God; therefore God shows sinners the way.” Our Sages explicated (Yalkut Shimoni Psalms, ibid.): “Why good? Because it is right. Why right? Because it is good, that God is a guide for those who return, for God gave murderers cities of refuge.”The intent of our Sages in this was that every action that a person does can be upright by itself, however we cannot discern and decide if it is good, for the good is not measured only for in its time, but rather, especially, in the effects of the action in the future, something that is invisible to the eyes of people. Therefore, even an action that is thought to be total good, we still do not have absolute confidence that it is actually good, and what is the result which the action hides in the bosom of the future (so too in regard to the evil). However, the Blessed One is not like this. All God's actions are simultaneously perfect in both aspects, since God looks and sees to the end of all generations, all God's commandments are both upright from the point of view of the universal righteousness, and also good in their results and ends.The example that our Sages OBM chose to prove their claim is cities of refuge for murderers. This is the goal of our topic, to prove how wonderful the laws of the living God and their punishments are, that they are both good and right simultaneously.We will especially stress the central thread of the laws of Torah which is the personal freedom of every resident of Israel, and we will start with the laws of cities of refuge for those who murder accidentally. This is a typical example of the true and just laws, in the aspect of good and right, that our Sages OBM chose in their above explication, whose foundation is the negation of incarceration.For the Holy Blessed One, who is the guide for those who return, after they have fallen into the world of crime, did not choose to punish them with incarceration, because that is good and right. Even if incarceration seems to be right and just—however it is definitely not good, not of itself because it entails the loss of personal freedom, and also not its goal results because it does not have that which shows the path to those who return, and might even do the opposite. It is possible that it initiates a further fall, and these matters are well known. Therefore “God gave murderers cities of refuge,” a punishment which is “good and right.”“There are three who kill unintentionally: one who kills completely by accident and without intention, and about this it says: “If he did not do it by design,” his judgment is that he is exiled to a city of refuge and saved. There is one who kills and the lack of intention is closer to an act of God, that is, in this one's death an extraordinary event happens which is not found generally in human actions. This one is not obligated to exile, and if the blood avenger kills him, he is killed for this. There is a manslayer in which the accident is closer to intentional, and that is that the matter comes close to negligence, or the manslayer should have been cautious and was not. The law here is that the manslayer is not exiled since the sin is great and therefore exile does not atone and the cities of refuge do not assimilate him. Therefore, if the blood avenger finds and kills him in any place—the blood avenger is innocent. What might this manslayer do? He should sit and guard himself from the blood avenger” (Maim. Laws of Murder 6:1).After studying these wonderful laws in depth and reflecting upon them, the brilliant light of of the Torah of the living God is revealed to our eyes, in all is luminescence, if we compare the serious carceral punishments on one hand, with the lenient ones on the other that the civil law demands.In the case of one who kills with a complete lack of intention, however, it is not close to an act of God, the Torah takes into account the feelings of of revenge which beat in the heart of the blood avenger, and even the law cannot protect the life of this killer. Therefore, the Torah established the punishment of exile whose goals is two fold: to save the killer from the anger of the blood avenger: “Otherwise, when the distance is great, the blood-avenger, pursuing the manslayer in hot anger, may overtake him and kill him; yet he did not incur the death penalty, since he had never been the other's enemy”; andto punish the killer with this for his mistake, to teach him the ways of caution and responsibility of a person who is in their nature always forewarned. And in this way to protect the life of the society from similar unintentional harms. In addition to all this comes the mysterious claim that exile atones for sin. The Giver of the Torah knew that this sad incident only happened to this person because they were already guilty of another sin.One who kills in an unintentional manner that is close to an act of God—an extraordinary and rare incident—he is completely innocent. There is no reason to punish the killer, not even with the lightest of punishments. The blood avengers must also be convinced that there is no justification for chasing down this pathetic person who is innocent of any guilt. If despite all this, the hot anger overtakes the blood avenger and he kills the killer, the law protects in this incident.One who kills in an unintentional manner which is closer to intentional, it is like an act of negligence, however there was no intent to murder. This is a grave incident and close to homicide, which cannot be excused with the punishment of exile, and in this manner to insure the life of the murderer from the hands of the blood avenger. It is also impossible to execute the killer since it was unintentional. The Torah said: “He should sit and guard himself from the blood avenger.” Studying this detail reveals to us the loftiness of God's Torah. Civil law send this person to extended imprisonment, something which, in the eyes of God's Torah is definitely unacceptable and inflicts damage on individual liberty, and at the same time does not save the person from the rage of the blood avenger. It has happened in many cases that after a murderer served their sentence in jail, they were murdered upon release by the blood avenger, and what is use of that?According to everyone, the punishment is not an end in itself, its purpose is to reform the criminal, or “so that they will hear and fear” [i.e., deterrent], and what use is incarceration to these ends? Incarceration, in various guises, has existed forever, and experience teaches that imprisonment does not educate the criminal. Even the education that is provided in jail in the areas of employment and work skills, acquiring a profession, moral education, have not shown substantive results. God's Torah knew that there is no basis for all this, and decided: One who kills in an unintentional manner which is closer to intentional, their blood is permitted and they should defend their own life. When they are chased down, and they are forced to wander to distant places and be on guard from the blood avenger, they will learn the ways of caution to protect the life of another. If we take a deeper look we will find that this one is also punished in exile, but their punishment is worse, for their defense is not placed in our hands but, rather, in their own hands, and in any event neither the manslayer who kills with a complete lack of intention, nor the one whose killing is closer to intentional should have their spirit and liberty confined in the four cubits of a jail, something which in and of itself is unacceptable and lacks any benefit, as we mentioned. Furthermore, it is harmful. After one is released from jail, after they have totally cut their ties with the community and the like, they are neglected and abandoned by society. Until they succeed to reintegrate in the life that they were cut off from, there is a serious danger that further crimes will be their only option. Therefore the Torah decided that they must either be exiled to a city of refuge, or guard their own life, wherever they will be able to continue their life without cutting all ties with society.Even our Sages only legislated incarceration for a certain category of murderers: “One who hires a killer to kill their fellow … or who binds them and places them in front of a lion … they are not liable to be condemned to death by the court. … All these murderers and those like them who are not liable to be condemned to death by the court, if an Israelite King wants to kill them by the law of the monarchy… he is permitted to do so, and so too if the court deems it necessary to kill them based on a temporary edict, if events demanded it, they have permission according to that which they understand. Behold, if the King did not kill them, or if events did not demand [their execution], the court is obligated to whip them until they are close to death, to incarcerate them in close and oppressive quarters for many years, and to inflict all matter of pain on them, in order to scare them and deter other evildoers, so the matter will not be a stumbling block to others who might say: I will kill my enemy like ploni did I will get away with it” (Maim. Laws Murder 2).This is the only time in Jewish law that a court incarcerates a person for cold-blooded and intentional killing. Even in this case the incarceration by itself is not a punishment for the transgression, it is rather in order to inflict all manner of pain “in close and oppressive quarters” in order to scare and deter other evildoers, to prevent similar actions in the future. However, incarceration as punishment does not exist in God's Torah at all, nor in the words of our Sages, for the liberty of an individual is the central line in its judgments.Therefore “God is good and right,” for God guides the way for those who return, for God gave murderers cities of refuge, as opposed to civil law, whose laws cannot raise up and transcend in this manner. For [the laws of Torah] are “good and right.”From the words of Maimonides above one can learn that in regard to all murderers who are not liable to be condemned to death by the court, the King of Israel could kill them by the law of the monarchy … or the court could execute them by way of a temporary decree if the time called for it.This authority, to kill a person by a temporary decree who otherwise would not be liable for a death penalty, is explained at length by Maimonides elsewhere, and there the authority of the court “to incarcerate in a prison” is also explained. In order that one who disagrees [with my general argument] will not have place to claim that in fact incarceration exists in halakhah, we will copy the words of Maimonides, in order to prove that any carceral punishment is by way of a temporary degree.So Maimonides writes (Laws of Sanhedrin 24: 4–10): “A court has the authority to administer lashes to a person who is not required to receive lashes and to execute a person who is not liable to be executed. This license was not granted to overstep the words of the Torah, but rather to create a fence around the words of the Torah. […] as a temporary decree, not as permanent law forever. … So too the court has the authority … to administer lashes to a person who gains the reputation of being a sinner … so too a judge may always alienate a person's money. … So too a judge has the authority to ban and excommunicate one who is not eligible to be banned, in order to respond to an observed moral deficiency and the requirements of the hour. … So too, a judge may pick a fight with one with whom it is appropriate to fight, and curse them and hit them. … So too the judge has the authority to bind one hand and foot and jail them in a prison and jostle them and drag them on the ground. … All these matters are in accordance with what the judge deems appropriate and that is required by the exigencies of the hour. In all matters the actions of the judge will be for the sake of Heaven, and the honor of people should not be taken lightly in the eyes of the judge for he overrides a Rabbinic prohibition, certainly, this applies with regard to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who uphold the Torah of truth. He must take care not to ruin their honor and act only to increase the honor of the Omnipresent. For whenever a person debases the Torah, his person will be degraded for people at large. Conversely, when a person honors the Torah, his person will be honored by people at large. And there is no other honor for the Torah except to follow its statutes and judgments.”It is clear to me, and it is a matter that needs no proof, that all that Maimonides enumerated in this chapter, including incarceration, is not “the laws and judgments” of Torah, and a judge who uses these types of punishment, in a situation that it is not appropriate to the specific sinner, and also the hour did not demand it, behold he desecrates the honor of the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and humiliates the Torah, for “the honor of the Torah is only to follow its laws and judgments.”It is only when a judge sees a specific need to “fix the deficiencies” of the generation, and it is appropriate for this specific person to receive this specific punishment that it is permitted to override the laws of the Torah and to punish accordingly, including with incarceration. From here it is clear that incarceration is not among the punishments of the Torah and cannot be deployed except as temporary decree as a result of the needs of the hour.The same principle that was explained in the laws of murder applies too in the punishments for monetary law. When a thief is caught, “he pays double,” “if he lacks the means, he shall be sold for his theft.” The imprisonment of this [thief] will not help one bit to the one who lost their money in a bad matter. The thief themselves will “hang out” for a specific time in prison at the expense of the state, and who or what are benefitted by that? If he is a repeat offender, reality has proven that for these types of people prison is merely a rest and a break between committing one crime and committing another. For these people, the Torah has already granted the courts wide authority to punish with grave punishments extrajudicially, as we have explained. If one stole “to fill his stomach for he was hungry”—the very fact of imprisonment is questionable logically, and also its utility is questionable, for what would this type of imprisonment fix? The economic situation of the thief would definitely not be improved as a result of this. How do you know that once the prison term is served that he would not be forced back into theft? Therefore the Torah declared: “he shall be sold for his theft.” He is sold as a slave, he continues to live an upstanding life of labor, supporting himself from the toil of his hands, and at the same time he pays off the theft. Since the matter of slavery has come to our hands—we will explain it. What the is quality of this slavery? Freedom and slavery are not measured according to the possibilities of the movement of a person. There are some who are absolutely free to move —and yet they are like an indentured slave. Yet one could actually be an indentured slave, in fact be truly free or close to it.When the Torah established the laws of the Hebrew slave, it made certain that his life would be established on true freedom and not pseudo-freedom. A thief who is imprisoned for his sin in a jail should definitely not be called free. However, when the thief is sold for his theft one can still call him freed in a certain manner. For what is enslaved life? An obligation to work in the master's house for a period of time; and what is all of life in the great jail which is the world? Behold every person is enslaved to their job and for their income. Every person is a slave to their employer (despite the rights and benefits of a worker's life), if not under the pressure of the employer who cannot make him work against his will, then as a result of the pressures of life which force him to work; so in effect he turns out to be enslaved to his employer. Essentially, the difference is that every person is able to change their place of work when they wish - if they have that chance; however, a Hebrew slave is obligated to serve this master until the period of his servitude ends, if he is not able to redeem himself. Therefore the Torah stresses a number of times: “… do not subject him to the treatment of a slave. He shall remain with you as a hired or bound laborer;” (Leviticus 25:39–40) “for in the six years he has given you double the service of a hired man.” Deut. 15:18) and so on. The advantageous side of the life of a Hebrew servant is that his master is obligated for the support of his wife and children, if he is married and has children, as opposed to a free worker who works for a living, and these matters are long and involved.See in Maimonides (Laws of Slaves 1:6–9) how much the Torah was concerned for the proper and good living conditions for this slave. Not only was his master forbidden to work him ruthlessly and set him unpleasant tasks, but also his master was forbidden to make his own lifestyle better than the slave; they would eat from the same bread, and they would sleep in the same type of bed, and live in the same house, to the point that it should not surprise anyone that there were slaves whom, at the end of their term of enslavement would announce: “I love my master, and my wife and children: I do not wish to go free” (Exodus 21:5) “for he loves you and your household and is happy with you” (Deut. 15:16). For the Torah was concerned for the comforts of his life. As the Sages stated midrashically: One who buys a slave, buys himself a master” (Kid. 20a). The foundations of this phenomenon are found not only in the comforts in the master's house, but rather because the educational goals of the criminal were attained. Here the slave tasted the taste of true freedom. He saw and recognized the way of life of decent people; how a person works and supports themselves honorably from the effort of their hands (go and compare the living conditions in the best jails to those of the Hebrew slave according to God's Torah).Thus the Torah “punished” the thief who is unable to pay double and “is sold for his theft.” It is understood that this type of punishment for theft that the Torah decreed, is fit for the lifestyle of that time and there is no intention to advocate for its renewal. Also, there is no possibility to do so, for “the Hebrew slave [law] are only in the time that the Jubilee year is practiced.” (Arachin 29a) The reason is that only in a time that all of Israel are settled on their land and the Sabbatical Years and the Jubilees are in practice, and the light of God's indwelling is upon God's chosen people, who act according to the laws of the Torah and its commandments in totality, then there is place for the Hebrew slave. For in that situation the Torah is sure that the goal of this punishment will be achieved—payment of the theft with the addition of a fine, and also the education of the criminal toward the way of the good. However, we discussed this in order to teach the foundations of God's Torah's view on the individual freedom and societal status of a person who is created in the image of God; that no one has the right to imprison a person's spirit, their freedom of movement and liberty, for they are the holy of holies of every person who was created in the Image, and in every generation and era one has to adapt the punishments of society's wrongdoers in the spirit and the view of God's Torah in relation to the conditions of life.Therefore, one who attached themselves and their assets (for a debt) and hid their assets—shall they be imprisoned? Rabbi Shlomo ibn Aderet [1235–1310 Spain] answered this question in his responsa: “The body is not attached so that it might be sold and [the debt] paid as a thief is sold for their theft, and also not that it might be imprisoned.” Behold it is clear that even if it is known definitively that he hid his assets we do not jail him, and the reason is clear. Since a person's body is not mortgaged it shall not be sold nor imprisoned.This is also the opinion of Maimonides: “The law of Torah is that at the time that the lender demands repayment of the debt, if the borrower has assets … and if the borrower is not found to have any assets … the borrower will go on his way and they do not jail him.” (Laws of Lending and Borrowing 2:1). The understanding of his words is that if nothing belonging to the borrower is found, and the court does not know whether in truth he does not have assets, or he has hidden assets and does not want to repay—for this they do not imprison the borrower. However, if he is under a presumption that he has assets—perhaps Maimonides will then decide that the court jails him? From the explanation that Rabbi Vidal de Toulouse [1283–1360 Spanish/French] wrote [of the words of Maimonides]: “It is simply that we have never seen in any place that the body is put under obligation as a result of debt, or an oath that the borrower had no money.” The implication is that there is no difference, and it is understood that the reason is like the reasoning of Rabbi Shlomo ibn Aderet and both of them are of the same opinion. …Behold it is explained clearly, that there is no carceral punishment for one who evades repayment of their debts according to Maimonides, from the essence of the laws of Torah and its judgments but only as a temporary decree. […]It is now obvious, that according to the understanding of the Bet Yosef (Rabbi Yosef Karo) of Maimonides [and others] all of whom think that it is not permissible to incarcerate a person for non-payment of a debt, and one should coerce him with all the tools that the court deems appropriate, however, not with corporal enslavement in prison. Therefore Rabbi Yosef Karo adjudicated: “… however if the time came to repay the debt and [the messenger of the court] came to collect the debt and the debtor does not want to pay and he is under the presumption that he has assets and is hiding them; the messenger of the court enters the house to repossess and pays off the lender, for repayment of a debt to the lender is [the fulfillment of] a commandment, and they hit him until his life ends in order to fulfill it. However, they do not coerce him to lease himself out … and he cannot imprison him or enslave him” (Hoshen Mishpat 97:15).However, Rabbi Moshe Isserles in his commentary Darkei Moshe and in his comments to Hoshen Mishpat decided: “This is specifically if he cannot pay, however, if has the resources and does not want to pay, the court imprisons him and hits him … and coerces him to pay.” …Jewish communities have ordained imprisonment for those who evade repayment of their debts, as explained in the responsa discussed above … and it is all in order that “the door is not locked before borrowers,” and they relied on the opinions of the lenient decisors. They even went overboard somewhat in some communities, imprisoning even those who had no money to pay, against the law. In any event, the goal of our discussion was to clarify and prove that this is not a normal punishment in the judgments of the Torah according to the majority of the early decisors.(“Detention” for criminals who are charged with serious crimes, lashes and execution, whether because of religious or criminal transgressions, who are waiting for the adjudication of their cases, is beyond the scope of our discussion; for in those cases the matter of “detention” is clearly mandated in the Torah, Leviticus 24:12, and Exodus 20:19, and the words of the Sages on the verse. That is outside the scope of our discussion since there the topic is “detention” until adjudication, and not “imprisonment” as a punishment for a sin, which does not, in my humble opinion, exist in the Torah at all.)To summarize our discussion we will say: we have merited that thousands of years after the giving of the Torah, the problem of imprisonment for transgressors is being discussed in the spirit of our holy Torah (even though there is no solution), both the aspect of the usefulness to incarceration, and in the aspect to the moral right of society to imprison the spirit of a person, and the liberty of his freedom. One of the great legal scholars in our generation said: “Our obligation is concern with just law. Furthermore, we must care for the criminal themselves, and beyond this for human dignity.” We would add in the spirit of our holy Torah: beyond all our obligations we must care for the image of God in a person, “For in the image of God, God made the Adam.”We will finish with that with which we started:The Book of Deuteronomy is called “The Book of the Right,” because it comes to teach us something wonderful. That which is in our eyes, flesh and blood eyes, is “good” and beyond the letter of the law, is in the eyes of God, the giver of the Torah, both right and the law. In the concepts of our holy Torah “the right and the good” “the good and the right” (the two verses which we quoted at the start of our discussion) is “the right.” Therefore the book of Deuteronomy is called “the Book of the Right,” for in it this great idea is explained, and it is articulated in the carceral punishments given to murderers by the Giver of the Torah, which as King David said in Psalms: “Is good and right.”
Publication Year: 2020
Publication Date: 2020-12-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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