Title: Why Do Companies Disclose Realizable or Realized Executive Compensation in Proxy Statements
Abstract:This paper examines the determinants of companies’ disclosure policy regarding alternative compensation measures (realizable and realized CEO compensation). We hypothesize and find that a company is m...This paper examines the determinants of companies’ disclosure policy regarding alternative compensation measures (realizable and realized CEO compensation). We hypothesize and find that a company is more likely to disclose realizable and/or realized CEO compensation in the following cases: (1) when a CEO gets higher compensation; (2) when the company’s performance is relatively poor; (3) when a major proxy advisory firm indicates higher concern about pay for performance; and (4) when the company receives relatively unfavorable Say on Pay votes in the preceding proxy season. We also find that following disclosure of alternative compensation measures, companies receive more favorable votes on Say on Pay by shareholders.Read More
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-08-12
Language: en
Type: article
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