Title: Metaphilosophical Reflections on the Idea of Metaphysics
Abstract:One constant in Wittgenstein’s thought, early and late, is his denial not only of metaphysical naturalism, but of methodologically monistic scientism, a broadly epistemological view that is often take...One constant in Wittgenstein’s thought, early and late, is his denial not only of metaphysical naturalism, but of methodologically monistic scientism, a broadly epistemological view that is often taken to be a consequence of such a metaphysical view. This is the claim, roughly, that scientific knowledge is the form of knowledge, and scientific understanding is the only kind of understanding that deserves the name. “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences,” he says in the Tractatus, and this view seems to be part of what lies behind the theoretical quietism of the later work. In fact, I think Wittgenstein thinks that if systematic philosophical theorizing were possible, it would mean that philosophy is an empirical science. Since it is not, philosophers must eschew theorizing, restricting themselves instead to light, local descriptions of discursive practices, where such descriptions might provide helpful reminders in freeing ourselves from the sort of misunderstandings and puzzlements that arise precisely from the theories implicit in inherited pictures of what is going on when we think and talk. Whether or not Wittgenstein himself reasoned in this way, I Philosophia (2012) 40:13–26 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9332-7Read More
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 4
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