Abstract: A directed graph game consists of a cooperative game with transferable utility and a digraph which describes limited cooperation and the dominance relation among the players. Under the assumption that only coalitions of strongly connected players are able to fully cooperate, we introduce the digraph-restricted game in which a non-strongly connected coalition can only realize the sum of the worths of its strong components. The Myerson value for directed graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the digraph-restricted game. We establish axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value for directed graph games by strong component efficiency and either fairness or bi-fairness.
Publication Year: 2020
Publication Date: 2020-02-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 9
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