Title: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT by the Generating Force
Abstract: THE COLD WAR lulled the Army into the complacency of deliberate, methodical, and time-consuming doctrinal process. Today, however, the accelerated operational tempo of the War on Terrorism has forced us to take an honest, in-depth look at how we collect, analyze, debate, codify, write, and disseminate doctrine. We now find that we must alter our approach to provide timely, accurate, and relevant to the field and the schoolhouses. As the proponent for the generating force, the U.S. Army Training and Command (TRADOC) must be proactive and innovative in its approach to knowledge management to provide the best possible support to the operating force--those units deployed, preparing for deployment, or returning from deployment. The current wars exacerbate the challenges of knowledge management, and as the demand to do more with less increases, the job gets even tougher. However, the history of reveals that the community has faced significant adversity in the past. Today's challenges are nothing new. Historical Perspective Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines Army as a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of joint force. focuses on how to think--not what to think. (1) Army complements joint doctrine. It describes the Army's approach and contributions to full-spectrum operations on land. Army is authoritative but not prescriptive. Where conflicts between Army and joint arise, joint takes precedence. shapes the way the Army thinks, prepares, and conducts warfare. Think and prepare equate to educate and train. is the heart of our professional competence. FM 3-0 explains that establishes common approaches to military tasks, promotes mutual understanding, facilitates communication among Soldiers, and serves as the basis for training and leader development. (2) Useful must be widely known and easily understood. It must have philosophical and intellectual foundation as well as practical purpose. Although this sophisticated view of dates from the 1960s, the Army only recently began to give it credence. For long time, doctrine had different meaning to the Army. From the time of the American Revolution to the late 19th century, doctrine meant drill. Up through the Civil War, the U.S. Army used Baron von Steuben's revised Prussian manual (the Blue Book) and Winfield Scott's Infantry Tactics to train troops to move and maneuver on the battlefield. These works were valuable in their day, but became obsolete when the era of Napoleonic warfare ended. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, was an individual endeavor, as there were few published doctrinal manuscripts to facilitate training either the individual or the unit. In 1905 the War Department published its first Field Service Regulations, outlining the of the division and how it operated. Doctrine now meant organization and tactics rather than drill. It stayed that way until the 1962 version of FM 100-5, Operations, moved away from discussing arms and services to discussing the nature of war and the operational environment. In 1973, as the U.S. Army completed its withdrawal from Vietnam, TRADOC emerged from the break-up of the old Continental Army Command. For the first time in its history, the Army had an dedicated to the formulation of doctrine. TRADOC soon made its mark. The next versions of FM 100-5 refocused on the operational level of war and brought us AirLand Battle, aimed at defeating massed Soviet armor formations. The Soviet Union fell in 1991, but that same year the Army employed AirLand Battle masterfully in Iraq, during Operation Desert Storm. Unfortunately, the end of the Soviet Union and the successful conclusion of the Gulf War did not usher in an era of peace and stability. …
Publication Year: 2008
Publication Date: 2008-07-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 5
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