Abstract: This dissertation investigates why certain post-conflict peace between states last longer than others.Many ceasefires break down within a few years, which suggests that despite tremendous costs, violence has been a surprisingly ineffective means of solving international disputes, although existing literature assumes that armed conflict mitigates the causes of conflict.Specifically, two theoretical puzzles are drawn from this observation.The first puzzle is why conflicting parties often dishonor ceasefires to which they once mutually agreed.Because rational adversaries must believe that they are better off terminating conflict than continuing fighting at the moment of the conflict's termination, they should not have an incentive to renege on the settlement in the same environment.The second puzzle is why countries fail to peacefully renegotiate an initial settlement and resort to force when they become dissatisfied with it.Revisionist wishes do not necessarily imply that further fighting is inevitable because adversaries can peacefully renegotiate the terms of the original settlement if necessary.This situation is all the more puzzling considering that, in the framework of the existing literature, combat resolves the cause of conflict, whether it is informational asymmetry or a commitment problem.To solve these questions, this dissertation provides a game-theoretic model that analyzes conflict termination, renegotiation, and conflict resumption as a single process.My theory demonstrates that uncertainty regarding the degree to which resources acquired during conflict empower the gainer determines the stability of post-conflict peace because the divergence between the ex-ante expectation and ex-post realization of the gainer's post-conflict power growth provokes a revisionist and opportunistic incentive for the loser.Specifically, conflict resumes when the country who obtained resources, such as territory, during a conflict fails to fully exploit the resources because such temporal stagnation in resource usage incentivizes the loser to seek an opportunity to recapture some resources before the gainer can fully utilize the resources.Conversely, the loser appeases his growing vi