Title: Spinoza’s Conatus as an Essence-Preserving, Attribute-Neutral Immanent Cause: Toward a New Interpretation of Attributes and Modes: Eric Schliesser
Abstract: In this chapter I characterise exactly what kind of cause Spinoza’s conatus
is. I do this in two steps. First, I ask and answer the following question:
‘What philosophical problem could Spinoza’s conatus concept be seen as
solving?’ This illuminates the nature of the concept and, given its central
importance to Spinoza, thus, a core aspect of Spinoza’s system. By refl ecting on some of Spinoza’s youthful observations (on Descartes), I argue that
Spinoza’s monism can be fruitfully understood as responding to a number
of interconnected problems in Descartes’ treatment of divine concurrence
and conservation (Sections II-IV).2 To be clear, Spinoza adapts a Cartesian
framework for his own very un-Cartesian ends.3 I assume without further
argument that Descartes’ metaphysics is designed to make natural philosophy possible,4 while Spinoza’s metaphysics intends to make enduring happiness possible.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-02-01
Language: en
Type: article
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