Title: Blameworthiness in Games with Imperfect Information.
Abstract:Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take ...Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was.
The main technical result of the paper is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.Read More
Publication Year: 2018
Publication Date: 2018-11-05
Language: en
Type: preprint
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Cited By Count: 2
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