Title: Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with leader and follower
Abstract: We consider a Stackelberg type dynamic two-players zero-sum game. One of two players is the leader and the other player is the follower. The game is a two-stages game. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable. In the second stage the follower determines the value of its strategic variable given the value of the leader's strategic variable. On the other hand, in the static game two players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variable. We will show that Sion's minimax theorem (Sion(1958)) implies that at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with a leader and a follower the roles of leader and follower are irrelevant to the payoffs of players, and that the Stackelberg equilbria of the dynamic game are equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.
Publication Year: 2018
Publication Date: 2018-10-20
Language: en
Type: preprint
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 1
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot