Abstract: Chapter 16 Why Reject Substance Dualism? Ian Ravenscroft, Ian RavenscroftSearch for more papers by this author Ian Ravenscroft, Ian RavenscroftSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Jonathan J. Loose, Jonathan J. LooseSearch for more papers by this authorAngus J. L. Menuge, Angus J. L. MenugeSearch for more papers by this authorJ. P. Moreland, J. P. MorelandSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 May 2018 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch16 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract This chapter draws an analogy between substance dualism (SD) and one kind of creationism. Some substance dualists appear to believe that SD is preferable to physicalism because only the former can account for the existence of morality. Some dualists are attracted to emergence, although it is unclear that it is a form of SD; indeed, it is not clear that it is a form of dualism at all, and if it is it would seem to be a form of property dualism. The chapter discusses SD's relationship to three key elements of religious doctrine and the idea of emergence. It describes most serious arguments for physicalism and consequently against SD. According to SD, mind and brain are radically different substances, the former nonphysical, the latter physical. Advocates of occasionalist SD claim that God appropriately correlates mental and physical events occasion by occasion. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism RelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2018
Publication Date: 2018-05-10
Language: en
Type: other
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 2
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