Abstract: Chapter 9 Cartesian Substance Dualism Richard Swinburne, Richard SwinburneSearch for more papers by this author Richard Swinburne, Richard SwinburneSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Jonathan J. Loose, Jonathan J. LooseSearch for more papers by this authorAngus J. L. Menuge, Angus J. L. MenugeSearch for more papers by this authorJ. P. Moreland, J. P. MorelandSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 May 2018 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch9Citations: 7 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract Rene Descartes's argument begins from one obviously true premise that (at the time when he was considering this argument) Descartes is thinking. It then proceeds by means of two principles about what is "conceivable" to the conclusion that Descartes is essentially "a thinking substance distinct from his body, which he calls his 'soul'". This chapter looks in more detail at Descartes's argument. It explains some of the terminology which Descartes uses. Descartes consists of two parts - an essential part (his soul) and an inessential part (his body). And, Descartes would add, what applies to Descartes, applies to all other humans. Hence substance dualism - humans consist of two substances, a soul (the essential part) and a body (the inessential part). The chapter illustrates how there can be Descartes's propositions whose metaphysical modality differs from their logical modality. Citing Literature The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism RelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2018
Publication Date: 2018-05-10
Language: en
Type: other
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 10
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