Title: Rational imitation of goal-directed actions in 14-month-olds
Abstract: Rational imitation of goal-directed actions in 14-month-olds Gyorgy Gergely ([email protected]) Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1132 Budapest, Victor Hugo u. 18-22, Hungary Harold Bekkering ([email protected]) Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research Amalienstr. 33, D 80799 Muenchen, Germany Ildiko Kiraly ([email protected]) Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1132 Budapest, Victor Hugo u. 18-22, Hungary Abstract The study sheds new light on the nature of imitative learning in 14-month-olds. It is demonstrated that while infants of this age can indeed imitate a novel means modelled to them, they do so only if the action is seen by them as the most rational alternative to the goal available within the constraints of the situation. The findings support the ‘rational imitation’ account over current ‘imitative learning’ or ‘emulative learning’ accounts in explaining re-enactment of goal-directed action in 14- month-olds. familiar, and easier-to-perform action alternative available to them)? In his work on the social transmission of tool use in chimpanzees, Tomasello (1999) differentiated between ‘imitative learning’ – which seems to be a human- specific capacity – and ‘emulation learning’ that is characteristic of nonhuman primates. Introduction In a well-known study Meltzoff (1988, 1999) demonstrated that 14-month-olds are already capable of delayed imitation of a novel goal-directed action. Infants observed a salient novel action performed by an adult model on a black box with a translucent orange plastic panel for a top surface. The box had a light bulb hidden in it. The model leaned forward from the waist and touched the panel with his/her forehead as a result of which the box was illuminated. The infants were given the box only on a separate visit a week later when 67% of them imitated the salient novel action: they leaned forward themselves to touch the box with their forehead (see Figure 1); an action they would not spontaneously perform (as shown by a control base-line condition). This demonstration indicates the remarkably early presence of imitative learning. Meltzoff argues that 14-month-olds differentiate between the actor’s goal (the visible outcome of the box lighting up) and the specific means (head-on-box) performed and “they imitate the means used, not solely the general ends achieved” (1995, p. 509). The present study addresses two important questions that arise in relation to Meltzoff’s intriguing demonstration: 1) Why do infants imitate the specific novel action modelled? 2) Why don’t they simply push the panel with their hand to achieve the outcome (this being a simpler, more Figure 1: Touching the box with the forehead Briefly, when primates observe a novel instrumental action that brings about an interesting outcome, they seem to focus on the salient outcome only without differentiating it from the particular means used. This is suggested by the fact that when they attempt to bring about the same outcome themselves – in contrast to young children – they do not directly imitate the specific means modelled. Rather, they perform a series of motor actions directed to the outcome that are already available in their motor repertoire, until – through a process of trial-and-error learning - they hit upon the same effective means that was modelled for them, as if ‘reinventing’ it by chance. Tomasello (1999) points out that if infants used emulation learning in the Meltzoff situation, one could expect that instead of imitating the novel and unfamiliar
Publication Year: 2001
Publication Date: 2001-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 6
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