Title: The Shapley Value and Consistency Axioms of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information
Abstract: In this paper, we study cooperative TU games in which the worths of some coalitions are not known. We investigate superadditive games and the Shapley values for general partially defined cooperative games. We show that the set of the superadditive complete games and the set of the Shapley values which can be obtained from a given incomplete game. Furthermore, we propose selection methods of the one-point solution from the set of the Shapley values and axiomatize one of the proposed solutions.
Publication Year: 2017
Publication Date: 2017-05-25
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 3
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