Title: Terrorism and organized crime in the wake of September 11, 2001
Abstract: The theory differentiates between classical terrorism and mega terrorism that has marked period of time after terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against New York and Washington. While classic terror seeks to supplement politics, and to be manifested as its criminalized projection, mega terrorism is qualitatively new phenomenon which itself is policy. The mega terrorism is about high stakes and high disproportion of power possessed by particular parties. The US policy has contributed most to creating such conditions globally, and United States is strategically responsible for it. For most part, this is not or will not even be realized by most prominent critics of international hegemony in United States policy. Aggressive stance of great power in international relations almost automatically instigates even greater number of antagonistic responses of other smaller powers, which all leads to more strained international relations. Military responses to mega terrorist threat have exactly caused its escalation, that is to say too aggressive responses to classical terrorist threats have partly brought about mega terrorism. The greatest blunder of (US or other influential powers’) response to mega terrorism is taking on warring model of military aggression, which provides terrorists with legitimacy that they have not had before. Corruption affairs in Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some other Balkan countries additionally corroborate that transition processes in most South East and even East European countries are accompanied by side effects in forms of economic and political systems criminalization resulting in serious issues of power distribution in Balkan transitions. In newly formed democracy, which is in conformity with contemporary trends in development of so called polyarchic democracy, political decisions are not always and necessarily made by institutions as state representatives, though they are made within these institutions. Public policy is separated from public and there emerges chronic deficit of government legitimacy. Parts of political establishment, linked to organized crime, create climate of the goal justifying means or of anything being allowed what is not strictly forbidden which helps creating conditions for legitimizing corruption and organized crime. The manifested destructive role of organized groups, and attitude of current authorities even of part of public, towards these groups during interethnic conflicts, and later on, have made it quite clear that links between organized crime and political elites in all parts of former SFR Yugoslavia are maintained through mutual client relationship, which international actors have nourished by their inconsistent behavior. The inconsistency of international support contributes to creating client cultures and these cultures lead to building relatively enduring partnerships between political elites and organized crime. Thus new type of organized crime emerges retaining classic feature (crime for profit), but is also modified into a new warring entity that resorts also to fight against state aiming to take over state power. The main problem in legitimizing violence in international relations in that this entails also legitimizing terrorist response to monopolizing of international relations and to so called intervention wars. The current US trend of re-legitimizing violence as method of combating terror is historically and safety wise retrograde. In such way worldwide terror stigma is just reduced while enlarging room for arguments of the terrorist having no choice. The same or similar is true for organized crime in Serbia or any other country under transition in South East Europe. The author believes that main principle of successful combating terrorism is maintaining moral status of nonviolence as an imperative in international relations. Contemporary politics, primarily U.S. global policy, which is based exactly on re-legitimizing violence, is in advance doomed to failure in combating terror.
Publication Year: 2004
Publication Date: 2004-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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