Title: The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures
Abstract:We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the number...We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the number of bits that need to be transmitted in order to reach a Nash equilibrium, and thus also on the required number of steps. Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players in each one of the following cases: (1) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium; (2) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian setting; and (3) reaching a mixed Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that some very simple and naive procedures lead to similar exponential upper bounds. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)Read More
Publication Year: 2006
Publication Date: 2006-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 3
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