Abstract: Philosophical PerspectivesVolume 29, Issue 1 p. 249-283 Original Article The Myth of the De Se Ofra Magidor, Ofra Magidor Oxford UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Ofra Magidor, Ofra Magidor Oxford UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 April 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12065Citations: 50Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Bermudez, J. L. 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