Abstract: It is eight years since the first edition of this book was published. Where relevant, I have sought to update the argument with new case and statute law. I have also developed the analysis, especially in Chapter 3, where a closer link between the two main sections, on motive and intention and indirect intention, is established. There, I have sought to bring out the conflict between ‘factual and cognitivist’ approaches to intention on the one hand and ‘morally substantive’ approaches on the other. This seems to me to involve a conflict central to criminal law, as is evidenced by its repetition in many areas. It is paralleled in the law of recklessness (Chapter 4), in the law of strict liability (Chapter 5) and in the law of acts (Chapter 6). Its existence spills over into defences like necessity and duress (Chapter 8) and the principles of sentencing (Chapter 10). Elsewhere, I have argued that it also underlies acute problems in the law of provocation (Norrie, 2001).Recognising the problem helps explain tensions in the law between formalism and informalism (below, pp 53–7), and many logical inconsistencies and contradictions with which criminal lawyers grapple.
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-10-09
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 1
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot