Abstract: Molinism implies that, for every possible agent S in every possible circumstance C, there are true propositions like that if S were in C, S would freely do A. Thus Molinism implies that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. This chapter begins by responding to a single argument against the claim that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. But this response will lead to positive conclusions about—and even a new characterization of—Molinism itself. In particular, this chapter will conclude that Molinism's fundamental commitment is that the world is a certain way. And if the world is the way that the Molinist says it is, then a variety of counterfactuals of freedom are true—and true because of how the world is.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-11-24
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 9
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